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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

JAMES KOROBAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case
No. 8636

vs.
JAMES A. HENDERSON,
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts in appellant's brief with the exception of the sentence stating, ((The
court also decided, as a matter of law, which defects were
latent." (Appellant's Brief, page 5.) The court merely attempted to set out which defects would be in issue at the
trial. In doing so the court did exclude from issue any defects
which were so obviously patent that no reasonable juror could
ever hold them to be otherwise. The court did leave in issue
any defects where evidence might show them to be latent
rather than patent (R. 39, 40, 43).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court's interpretation of paragraph 15 of the con-

tract was correct.
2. The court did not err in ruling that certain defects were

patent and others latent.
3. The court did not err in failing to award an attorney's
fee to plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
1. The court} s interpretation of paragraph 15 of the con-

tract was correct.
Appellant contends that paragraph 15 of their contract
prohibits claims for wrongful acts and neglects if not brought
\vithin a specified time, but does not affect claims for failure
to perforn1 the work required by the contract or for performing
it otherwise than as required by the contract (Appellant's
Brief, page 6.) Appellant relies upon the definitions of Hreimbursement," ttwrong" and nneglect" to show this paragraph
applies to claims in the nature of a tort, rather than contract.
In so arguing, appellant has overlooked both grammatical
construction and the general.proposition of the paragraph.
The first phrase of paragraph 15 states: ttl£ either party to
the contract shall suffer dttnlage in any 1nanner . . . -···
1n the first sentence of his brief appellant tells us, nit
is eletnentary that a cause of action for dantages arises upon
breach of a contract ..... Citing 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 388,
anJ 9 An1. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, 116. It
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would seem that the provision for damage in any manner"
should clearly embrace damages for breach of contract.
n

Words or terms appearing later in the sentence should
not alter this clear construction when those terms are subject
to varying connotations. Appellant cites Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.) definition of ((reimbursement" and ((wrong"
to show that this paragraph was meant to cover tort and not
contract claims. While ((reimbursement" is not generally used
in referring to rights of action for breach of contract, it does
adequate! y describe the recovery of damages for breach of
contract. When one party breaches a contract the other party
suffers a legal wrong. When the injured party is awarded the
difference between the value of the performance promised
and the value of the performance received it can be said that
he is being reimbursed for this legal wrong.
Appellant states: c(The word (wrong' has been stated to
signify, in its most usual sense, can injury committed to the
person or property of another, or to his relative rights unconnected with contract.' " Citing Black's L~w Dictionary (3d
Ed.) page 1862, and that: (Neglect' is ordinarily used in
connection with tortious conduct," with no authority cited for
this proposition (Appellant's Brief, page 7). Looking to
Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), page 1863, we find that
((wrong," in a more extended signification, ((includes the violation of a contract, a failure by a man to perform his undertaking or promise is a wrong or injury to him to whom it was
made." At page 1229 ((neglect" is defined as, ((Omission or
failure to do an act or perform a duty," and ((the term means
to omit, as to neglect business or payment or duty or work,
n
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and is generally used in this sense. It does not generally imply
carelessness or imprudence, but simply an omission to do or
perfonn some work, duty or act." It is submitted that appellant
has confused the terms neglect and negligence when he states,
'' 'Neglect' is ordinarily used in connection with tortious conduct."
Thus, it can be seen that a reasonable interpretation of
this first sentence of paragraph 15 of the contract, considering
the definitions of the words involved, could be said to limit
the time within which a claim may be brought for failure to
perform the work required by the contract, or for performing
it otherwise than as required. It is to be noted that the parties
to the contract were not attorneys. They did not place a strict,
legal interpretation upon the terms in their agreement. The
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words in a contract
is to be adhered to in construing the agreement. 9 Am. Jur.,
Building and Construction Contracts, § 8; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 232 et seq. ((Words chosen by the contracting parties
should not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary meaning
or given a curious, hidden sense which nothing but the exigency
of a hard case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind
can discover." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 236.
Looking to the manifest purpose of paragraph 15, we see
the unreasonableness of the construction placed upon these
\\'ords by the appellant. The paragraph limits to not later than
the tin1e of final payn1ent in '"hich claims can be made against
a party '" ho causes the other party any damage. This is a
con1tnon provision in building contracts. The purpose is
obviously to prevent the owner fron1 n1aking final payment,
()
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accepting the building, and then raising a claim for a defect
which was discoverable at a time when the builder could have
remedied the situation with ease. Constructing a building is
a complex undertaking. Many minor discrepancies are liable
to occur in violation of the plans and specifications. Certain
materials may not be immediately available, whereas their
equivalents are readily accessible. Policy and progress require
flexibility in such situations. American courts are united in
holding a substantial performance as being sufficient to comply wit'h the terms in a building contract. Omaha v. Hammond,
94 U.S. 98, 24 L. ed. 70; Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y.
239, 129 N. E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429, rehearing denied in 230
N.Y. 656, 130 N. E. 933, 23 A.L.R. 1435; Harrild v. Spokane
School District, 112 Wash. 266, 192 P. 1, 19 A.L.R. 811.
Paragraph 15 of appellant's brief allows an owner to
secure adequate and reasonable performance of his plans and
specifications, and yet prohibits him from continually harassing
the builder, who has moved his labor and equipment on to
new projects, with claims which should, and could, have been
made prior to accepting the building.
With this construction of paragraph 15 the meaning of
the exception found in the last sentence of the paragraph is
apparent. This exception did not broaden the meaning of
'(wrongful act" or ((neglect." Nor did the trial court necessarily look at the exception as if it had been thrown into the
contract by someone who didn't know what was coming next,
as appellant suggests. (Appellant's Brief, page 9.) This
clause did except from the limitation as to when a claim may
7
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be brought, any claim for faulty work or materials where the
parties expressly stipulate otherwise.
Appellant notes that paragraph 15 is the same as Article
31 of the standard contract used by the American Institute
of Architects, and contends that in the A.I.A. contract the
paragraph has not been used to apply to faulty workmanship
and materials. Appellant cites Article 20 of the standard contract used by the American Institute of Architects to support
this proposition. (Appellant's Brief, page 10.) Article 20
does not necessarily support this position. No authority supports appellant's proposition.
Respondent submits that the purpose of the exception
clause in paragraph 15 was to except any claim for damages
from this paragraph which would come under Article 20 of
the A.I.A. contract. Inasmuch as Article 20 or its equivalent
was not included in the contract under consideration, the excepting clause did not prevent claims for failures to perform
the work required by the contract from being brought under
paragraph 15. There are no other provisions in the contract
between appellant and respondent relating to faulty work or
materials. Therefore, the parties must have intended paragraph 15 to cover claims of this nature.
As appellant points out, the contract m question was
Jrav"'n by a scrivener employed by appellant. (Appellant's
Brief, page 11.) Respondent does not agree that the court
construed "against the plaintiff." (Appellant's Brief, page
1 1.) ,\.ppell~tnt should not be heard to question the reasonable
construl.'tion pbH.:eJ upon the contract. The circumstances,
\vorJs used, and positions of the parties shoVt' that the court
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did correctly ascertain the intention and manifest assent of
the parties.
2. The court did not err in ruling that certain defects were

patent and others latent.

Appellant also contends that the court erred in ruling
as a matter of law that certain defects were patent and others
latent. Appellant claims he ((should have been permitted to
show what the circumstances were and what type of inspection would have been necessary to discover the defects."
(Appellant's Brief, page 12.)
Appellant had two opportunities to show what the circumstances were. First, at the pre-trial conference before Judge
Ellett, appellant was given ample opportunity, and was even
encouraged, to come forth with sufficient information or
evidence in order to determine the issues involved. Secondly,
at the trial on t'he merits, appellant did rest its case without
bringing forth any evidence whatsoever as to the circumstances
which he now claims he was denied the right to show. In
addition to these two opportunities, depositions were taken
of both Mr. James Korobas and Mr. James A. Henderson
prior to the pre-trial conference.
At the pre-trial conference, Judge Ellett attempted to set
forth the matters which would be in issue at the trial. The
court made an attempt to have the circumstances brought forth,
questioning appellant's attorney, tel suppose you have that
information or wouldn't have put it in your cornplaint, and
if you have it, I ought to know it now" (R. 40). When appellant's attorney admitted he did not know to what extent the

9
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building was not square, Judge Ellett said, ttl£ you will advise
Mr. Bird ten days before trial the amount it is out, I will
leave it in" (R. 41). Appellant's attorney agreed to t'his, yet
respondent's attorney has never been advised as to this matter.
Appellant's attorney made no attempt to offer any evidence
or show any circumstances as to any of the claimed defects
at the pre-trial conference. Appellant's attorney was silent
during Judge Ellett's determination of what defects were
and what defects were not in issue (R. 41 and 42). On page
43, line 18 of the record, we find:
The court: tt . . . The issues then would be to try
those matters that I have set forth unless counsel can
show me that the patent defects are not excluded under
paragraph 15."
Mr. Roe: HI want to be free to refer to the whole
contract, of course, in so doing."
Thus, it can be seen that appellant did have an opportunity
to refute this narrowing of the issues, but declined to do so,
rei ying solei y on showing that patent defects are not excluded
under paragraph 15.
Federal Courts operating under a similar rule providing
for pre-trial conferences have pointed out the necessity for
free disclosure by all of the parties if such a conference is to
function properly. Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F.R.D.
24 (D.C. Jvfo. 1947), noticed that one of the vital purposes
of a pre-trial conference under Rule 16 is to acquaint parties
and (Oult 'vvith real issues of fact and la\v in a case so they
rnay be intelligently inforn1ed as to \vhat questions \vill be
for dctern1ination at a trial on the merits. Brown v. Christman,
10
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126 F. 2d 625, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 203, 1942, pointed out that
pre-trial conferences under Rule 16 reduce congestion of dockets and are important to the individual litigant as reducing
expense and delay. Appellant's attorney did not make the
slightest effort to put forth any evidence as to the circumstances
at the pre-trial conference. This was after taking the depo5itions of both parties. It therefore seems unreasonable for
him to now tell the Supreme Court that he should have been
permitted to show what the circumstances were.
On November 29, 1956, the proceedings show:
{(The Court: t(All right. Then to get this matter before the court, may it be heard at this time on the merits
instead of tomorrow at ten o'clock?"
Mr. Roe: Hit may, yes."
Mr. Bird: t(Yes, that's agreeable."
The Court: t(All right."
Mr. Roe: rrPaintiff rests} your Honor." (R. 49 and
50.)
Thus, again appellant had an opportunity to show the facts,
yet did not do so.
It is to be noted that at the pre-trial conference appellant
v1aived a jury trial (R. 47). Appellant had two opportunities
to inform the court of ~he facts and circumstances of his claimed
defects, and did not avail himself of either. He should not now
be heard to say that he should have been permitted to show
((the circumstances."
We agree with appellant that under certain circutnstances
an incorrectly sloping roof 1s no more patent that mold in
11
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ketchup. The court agreed with appellant. At line 26 on page
39 of the record we find the court saying:
(( ... that the issue would be limited to the following matters set forth in paragraph 4 of the plaintiff's
complaint: Whether or not the roof was faulty in construction so as to cause leaking or whether the leak
is caused by reason of conduct on the part of plaintiffs
agents in climbing on the roof before it had settled."
It can be seen fuat the incorrectly sloping roof was made an
issue to be determined at a trial. In view of these facts appellant cannot now contend that he should have been permitted
to show the circumstances. He was permitted but did not
do so.

3. Tbe court did not err in failing to award an attorney's
fee to plaintiff.

Appellant contends that the court erred in failing to award
to plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee for enforcement of the
contract.
Appellant made no request at the trial for an award of
tlttorney's fee. Quite the contrary, appellant's attorney was apprehensive that he was the one \vho would be required to pay
costs (R. 49). Page 49, line 16 of the record shows:
!vir. Roe: ult probably \\·ould. About the costs, would
your order include that I have to pay him any costs,
or each party bear its own, or how do you \vant to work
that?"
T'hc Court: "He won,t have any costs if you disrniss
tlt)\\'.

Mr. Bird: "Our counter claim."
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The Court: ((Two and a half?"
Mr. Bird: ttl don't believe we did. I don't believe
we have."
The Court: ((You have got a counter-claim-two and
a half."
Mr. Bird: ((Each party to stand its own costs, then."
The Court: ((All right. Then to get this matter before the court, may it be heard at this time on the
merits instead of tomorrow at ten o'clock?"
The matter of attorney's fee was considered at the pretrial conference, where it was agreed that the winning party,
((if it goes to suit," would be entitled to reasonable attorney's
fee in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars (R. 47). The court
requested the defendant to study the situation with regards
to making a settlement. Defendant's attorney pointed out
that for three hundred dollars Mr. Henderson could do some
work towards settling unless he is awfully stubborn (R. 47).
The tender of $137.60 made on November 29, 1956, was made,
and was so understood by both parties, in order to a void
having to bring the matter ((to suit." Whether this amount
was actually due plaintiff was questionable, but defendant
made the tender in order to avoid the possibility of having to
pay three hundred dollars in case the matter went nto suit."
The court did not err in refusing to award an attorney's
fee to the plaintiff. Defendant's tender was made prior to the
matter going oto suit." The defendant had judgment at the
trial for no cause of action, with a direction for each party to
bear its own costs (R. 50). It was wisdom for the court to
let attorney's fees fall the same way.
13
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CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly construed Paragraph 15 of the
contract under consideration to apply to claims for faulty
workmanship or materials. The court gave appellant ample
opportunity to show the facts and circumstances as to every
claimed defect. Appellant took depositions, had a pre-trial
conference, a hearing before the court in settlement of the
matter, and a trial on the merits. Appellant should therefore
not be heard to say that he ((should have been permitted to
show what the circumstances were." The judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS and BIRD
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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